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Abstract
Background The US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) uses the Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS)
to support post-marketing safety surveillance programs.
Currently, almost one million case reports are submitted to
FAERS each year, making it a vast repository of drug
safety information. Sometimes cited as a limitation of
FAERS, however, is the assumption that ‘‘stimulated
reporting’’ of adverse events (AEs) occurs in response to
warnings, alerts, and label changes that are issued by the
FDA.
Objective To determine the extent of ‘‘stimulated
reporting’’ in the modern-day FAERS database.
Methods One hundred drugs approved by the FDA
between 2001 and 2010 were included in this analysis.
FDA alerts were obtained by a comprehensive search of the
FDA’s MedWatch and main websites. Publicly available
FAERS data were used to assess the ‘‘primary suspect’’ AE
reporting pattern for up to four quarters before, and after,
the issuance of an FDA alert.
Results A few drugs did demonstrate ‘‘stimulated
reporting’’ trends. A majority of the drugs, however,
showed little evidence for significant reporting changes
associated with the issuance of alerts. When we compared
the percentage changes in reporting after an FDA alert with
those after a sham ‘‘control alert’’, the overall reporting
trends appeared to be quite similar. Of 100 drugs analyzed
for short-term reporting trends, 21 real alerts and 25 sham
alerts demonstrated an increase (greater than or equal to
1 %) in reporting. The long-term analysis of 91 drugs
showed that 24 real alerts and 28 sham alerts demonstrated
a greater than or equal to 1 % increase.
Conclusions Our results suggest that most of modern day
FAERS reporting is not significantly affected by the issu-
ance of FDA alerts.
Key Points
Adverse event (AE) databases such as the US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) Adverse Event
Reporting System are assumed to suffer from
‘‘stimulated reporting’’.
‘‘Stimulated reporting’’ is the concept that public
disclosure of a safety issue by the issuance of, for
example, an FDA alert will result in substantially
increased AE rates for the drug and/or specific safety
issue mentioned in such an alert.
We analyzed both overall and AE-specific reporting
before and after 100 FDA alerts and found no
discernable pattern of increased reporting.
While certain drugs appeared to have their AE
reporting trends affected by an FDA warning, most
did not.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this
article (doi:10.1007/s40264-014-0225-0) contains supplementary
material, which is available to authorized users.
K. B. Hoffman (&)  A. R. Demakas  M. Dimbil 
C. B. Erdman
AdverseEvents, Inc., 3663 N. Laughlin Road,
Suite 102, Santa Rosa, CA 95403, USA
e-mail: keith@adverseevents.com
N. P. Tatonetti
Department of Biomedical Informatics, Columbia University,
New York, USA
Drug Saf (2014) 37:971–980
DOI 10.1007/s40264-014-0225-0
1 Introduction
Because of financial and logistical hurdles, pre-approval
clinical trials can never be large enough, or long enough, to
identify and properly characterize all adverse effects that
may occur once a drug is introduced to consumer popula-
tions. The gradual evolution of adverse event (AE) profiles
across numerous drugs (e.g., thalidomide, sibutramine,
cerivastatin, rofecoxib) [1–4], after they were approved by
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), serves to
underscore the preceding points.
Unfortunately, the time lag associated with the dissem-
ination of relevant post-marketing AE information is also a
significant concern. In fact, within 7 years after FDA
approval, only half of a drug’s serious post-marketing AEs
was listed in the Physician’s Desk Reference, a main
source of AE information for many prescribers [5]. Such
delays, combined with the aforementioned limitations of
the pre-approval clinical trial process, reinforce the need
for diligent post-marketing vigilance [5–8].
The FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS)
[9] is a centralized computerized information database that
is broadly used by the agency, and other pharmacovigi-
lance experts, for post-marketing drug safety surveillance
[6, 8, 10]. International government and related organiza-
tions also use spontaneous AE databases to identify post-
approval drug safety concerns.
Challenges to using FAERS data, however, have been
reported to include under-reporting [11, 12], the ‘‘Weber
Effect’’ [13, 14], and ‘‘stimulated reporting’’ [15–19]. With
regard to under-reporting, while it remains a significant
limitation, recent efforts by the FDA, global regulatory
agencies, and the healthcare industry itself are helping to
increase AE reporting rates. Indeed, almost one million AE
reports will be added to both the EudraVigilance [20] and
FAERS databases this year alone [21]. FAERS now has a
total of over seven million reports. With regard to the
‘‘Weber effect’’, a recent FAERS study [22] demonstrated
that it may be of less concern than it was in the past, likely
owing to an increasing focus on the importance and utility
of post-approval AE reporting by both regulatory and key
healthcare players [22, 23]. Unfortunately, organized FA-
ERS data are not readily accessible to healthcare profes-
sionals who instead rely heavily on safety information from
drug label ‘‘inserts’’ that are often based predominantly on
pre-approval clinical trial results and are frequently inad-
equate with regard to AE details [24].
To help guide prescribing decisions and arm healthcare
professionals with emerging post-marketing safety risks,
the FDA issues warnings [7, 18, 25], which have often
effectively modified prescribing behaviors [17, 19]. How-
ever, the alerts are sometimes challenged by the scientific
community [17, 26–29], numerous alerts can be required to
trigger an effect [30], and too often they have little to no
impact on prescribing patterns [17, 28, 31–33]. Occasion-
ally, regulatory action by the FDA can also have the
unintended consequence of depriving patients of effica-
cious and safe (when actually used as directed) medications
[34–39].
‘‘Stimulated reporting’’ refers to the concept that public
disclosure of a safety issue by the issuance of, for example,
an FDA alert will result in substantially increased AE
reporting rates regarding the drug and/or the specific AE
mentioned in such an alert. The term can also refer to
clustering of AE reports triggered by the activities of
consumer-based ‘‘support groups’’ and/or reporting activity
related to litigation. Stimulated reporting has important
implications regarding the utility of post-marketing AE
data, as alert-driven shifts in reporting could impact the
accuracy of comparative research and related analytical
methods such as disproportionality analysis.
Although a number of studies have evaluated the impact
of FDA alerts on drug use [16–19, 31, 33, 40–57], few have
comprehensively studied the impact of FDA alerts on AE
reporting. Past studies that have found evidence for stim-
ulated reporting with regard to post-marketing AE data
have generally examined solitary, or a single group of,
drugs.
A 1998–2004 study showed that the reporting fre-
quency of key AEs associated with statin use increased as
a result of FDA warnings, but a general increase in broad
AE reporting for drugs in the class was not observed [58].
A study of Italian AE databases indicated that three out of
four regulatory warnings triggered increased AE reporting
[38]. FDA-issued boxed warnings were linked to increa-
ses in FAERS reporting for multiple myeloma drugs [59].
Two French studies found evidence for stimulated
reporting via changes in disproportionality [60, 61]. A
study from The Netherlands found a media influence
regarding cardiac arrhythmias linked to antihistamines
[62]. An Australian study found an increase in reporting
odds ratios after media publicity regarding links between
a sleep medication and parasomnias and amnesia [63]. An
FDA alert influenced FAERS reporting of pancreatitis
linked to two diabetic medications [64]. FDA researchers
detailed a large increase in rhabdomyolysis reports linked
to statin drugs after an alert was issued on cerivastatin
[65].
While select FDA alerts appeared to have impacted AE
reporting rates, we have not found a broad study regarding
FAERS reporting trends after alert(s) are issued. Therefore,
we used a big data analytic platform [66] to quantify FA-
ERS reporting trends over a 10-year period regarding 100
drugs that had been issued an FDA alert.
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2 Methods
2.1 FAERS Data Preparation
Case reports that were missing or contained malformed key
identification fields [Individual Safety Report number
(ISR), patient number, drug sequence identification, or
Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities (MedDRA)
AE term] were discarded. As long as the aforementioned
key identification fields were contained in a given case
report, allowable missing fields included: age, gender,
weight, outcome, and condition. Cases were discarded if
the drug name was found to be indeterminate or if the name
was determined to not represent an FDA-approved drug
(e.g. dietary supplements, foods). In an effort to exclude
pre-approval AE case reports mistakenly logged into the
FAERS, the date of receipt for a given case report must
have occurred after the drug’s FDA approval date.
In instances where there were multiple, individual case
safety reports for the same identification number, we
selected the earliest reported case. For example, if a
patient reported adverse effects from the same drug in
2008 and 2010 and we ran a search against all primary
suspect cases for that drug across all dates, only the 2008
report would be included. However, if we were to run a
search against all primary suspect cases for 2010 only,
then the 2010 case would be included. Because the case
counts included in our analysis were restricted by quarter,
drug, and, when applicable, AE, we are confident that we
obtained a complete profile of the primary suspect cases
of interest.
Drug name text-mapping was accomplished as previ-
ously described by Hoffman et al. [66]. Drug names were
normalized to RxNorm reference codes [67] using string
searching and manual curation. National Drug File Refer-
ence Terminology [68] was used to provide ancillary
information on class and mechanism of action.
AE information was coded according to MedDRA
version 16.1 [69]. AEs mentioned in each safety alert (see
Electronic Supplemental Material) were mapped to Med-
DRA terms according to the following hierarchy: (1) AEs
linked to specific medical conditions were coded verbatim
to MedDRA Preferred Terms (i.e., ‘‘retinal detachment’’
was mapped to the MedDRA Preferred Term AE ‘‘retinal
detachment’’); (2) variations of specific AEs were also
coded to MedDRA Preferred Terms (i.e., ‘‘heart attack’’
was mapped to the Preferred Term ‘‘myocardial infarc-
tion’’); (3) AEs highlighting disorders pertaining to specific
organs or parts of the body were coded to MedDRA System
Organ Classes (i.e., ‘‘Central Nervous System Disorders’’
was mapped to the System Organ Class ‘‘Nervous system
disorders’’); and (4) generalized alert terms that encom-
passed multiple specific AEs were coded to MedDRA
Standardized MedDRA Queries (SMQs) (i.e., ‘‘hyper-
tension’’ was mapped to all Preferred Terms that fall under
the SMQ ‘‘Hypertension’’).
‘‘Primary suspect’’ designations in FAERS case reports
were quantified in an attempt to restrict the analysis to
those drugs directly suspected of causing the AE. (‘‘Pri-
mary suspect’’ is a description chosen by the person who
submitted a given case report and is their estimate of which
drug, if the subject was taking more than one, was likely
responsible for the observed AE).
Finally, drugs were mapped to their corresponding
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) codes [70] in an
attempt to determine if AE reporting patterns differed
across therapeutic class (see Electronic Supplemental
Material).
2.2 FDA Alert Data Collection
We searched for FDA alerts, and their associated issuance
dates, via the FDA’s MedWatch [71] and main [72]
websites.
A data mining platform specifically built to optimize
FAERS data [66] was used to quantify ‘‘primary suspect’’
case counts up to four calendar quarters before, and four
after, publicized FDA regulatory actions (Dear Healthcare
Professional Letter, Drug Safety Communication, Early
Communication, FDA Information for Healthcare Profes-
sionals, FDA Recall, Public Health Advisory, REMS
Issued, and Safety Labeling Changes).
2.3 Statistical Analysis
For our primary analysis, the number of quarterly AE cases
was collected for each drug for 2000–2012. Percentage
differences were obtained for quarter two and quarter four
prior, vs. quarter two and quarter four after, an FDA or a
sham alert and displayed as a histogram. Percentiles were
binned into 25 or 50 U increments starting with a minimum
bin of ‘‘-99 to -75’’ and ending at a maximum
‘‘1,200–1,249’’ bin.
Prescription drugs approved from 2000 to 2010 were
eligible for analysis. We assessed changes in short-term
reporting by comparing the amount of total reports in the
two quarters prior to the quarter the FDA alert was issued
in with the two quarters following such an alert. The same
method was used to assess longer-term reporting trends by
comparing four quarters before with four quarters after the
same FDA alert. Our inclusion criteria were: (1) two or
four full quarters between the FDA-approval date and alert
date for all two quarter and four quarter calculations,
respectively, (2) a minimum of four quarters was needed
between the alert date and quarter four 2012, (3) the drug
needed to have a minimum of 40 primary suspect cases in
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the both the alert quarter and the quarter directly prior to
the alert for the ‘‘all primary suspect’’ case report analysis,
and (4) the drug needed to have a minimum of five AE/
drug-specific cases in the both the alert quarter and the
quarter directly prior to the alert for the ‘‘AE-specific’’ case
report analysis. Over-the-counter and ‘‘street’’ drugs, vac-
cines, and broad, undefined compounds listed in FAERS
were not analyzed.
For internal control analysis, we used each drug (‘‘all
event analysis’’) as well as the specific AE/drug pairs as
their own controls by assigning a ‘‘sham alert’’ five quar-
ters before the actual FDA alert. We then evaluated the
percentage changes in reports (for both two quarter and
four quarter differences) for the sham alert in the same
manner that we analyzed drugs with actual FDA alerts. We
used the Mann–Whitney test to determine if there were
statistical differences between reporting rates for real
compared with sham alerts.
3 Results
Figure 1 shows both the short- and long-term percent
changes in primary case reporting for drugs that were
subjected to an FDA alert during the time period studied.
One hundred drugs were analyzed for short-term (two
quarters before and after alerts) effects, while 91 of those
100 drugs were analyzed for long-term (four quarters
before and after alerts) effects.
Figure 2 shows a short-term (two quarters prior vs. two
quarters after) comparison of reporting changes for 43 out
of 100 drugs that could serve as their own internal controls
(by having a sham alert set at five quarters before their
actual FDA alert). 21 real alerts and 25 sham alerts dem-
onstrated an increase (greater than or equal to 1 %) in
short-term reporting. If one were to define ‘‘stimulated
reporting’’ as a 50 % or higher increase in reporting, then 7
out of 43 actual FDA alerts and 7 out of 43 of sham alerts
would qualify.
For Fig. 2, we ran a rank sum (Mann–Whitney) test
comparing the two quarters prior vs. two quarters post
results for actual alerts compared with sham alerts. The
median percent change was not significantly different for
actual alerts (1 %) vs. sham alerts (9 %) with U = 957
(p = 0.78).
Figure 3 shows a long-term (four quarters prior vs. four
quarters after) comparison of reporting changes for 43 out
of 100 drugs that could serve as their own internal controls
(by having a sham alert set at five quarters before their
actual FDA alert). 24 real alerts and 28 sham alerts dem-
onstrated an increase (greater than or equal to 1 %) in long-
term reporting. If one were to define ‘‘stimulated report-
ing’’ as a 50 % or higher increase in reporting then 12 out
of 43 actual FDA alerts and 12 out of 43 sham alerts would
qualify.
For Fig. 3, we ran a rank sum (Mann–Whitney) test
comparing the four quarters prior vs. four quarters post
results for actual alerts compared with sham alerts. The
median percent change was not significantly different for
actual alerts (5 %) vs. sham alerts (30 %) with U = 1,022
(p = 0.40).
Figure 4 shows both the short- and long-term percent
changes in reporting of specific AE/drug pairs noted in
FDA alerts. 134 AE/drug pairs were analyzed for short-
term (two quarters before and after alerts) effects, while
124 of those 134 AE/drug pairs were analyzed for long-
term (four quarters before and after alerts) effects.
Figure 5 shows a short-term (two quarters prior vs. two
quarters after) comparison of reporting changes for 61 out
of 134 AE/drug pairs that could serve as their own internal
controls (by having a sham alert set at five quarters before
their actual FDA alert). 26 real alerts and 25 sham alerts
demonstrated an increase (greater than or equal to 1 %) in
AE-specific reporting. If one were to define ‘‘stimulated
Fig. 1 Short- and long-term percent changes in primary case reporting for drugs that were subjected to a US Food and Drug Administration alert
during the time period studied. 2Q two quarters, 4Q four quarters
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reporting’’ as a 50 % or higher increase in reporting, then
10 out 61 actual FDA alerts and 14 out of 61 sham alerts
would qualify.
For Fig. 5, we ran a rank sum (Mann–Whitney) test
comparing the two quarters prior vs. two quarters post
results for actual alerts compared with sham alerts. The
median percent change was not significantly different for
actual alerts (-3 %) vs. sham alerts (0 %) with U = 1,968
(p = 0.47).
Figure 6 shows a long-term (four quarters prior vs. four
quarters after) comparison of reporting changes for 61 out
of 134 AE/drug pairs that could serve as their own internal
controls (by having a sham alert set at five quarters before
their actual FDA alert). 30 real alerts and 49 sham alerts
Fig. 2 Short-term percent changes in primary case reporting for real alerts compared with sham alerts. 2Q two quarters
Fig. 3 Long-term percent changes in primary case reporting for real alerts compared with sham alerts. 4Q four quarters
Fig. 4 Short- and long-term percent changes in specific adverse event/drug pair case reporting for drugs that were subjected to an FDA alert
during the time period studied. 2Q two quarters, 4Q four quarters
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demonstrated an increase (greater than or equal to 1%) in
AE-specific reporting. If one were to define ‘‘stimulated
reporting’’ as a 50% or higher increase in reporting, then 17
out of actual FDA alerts and 33 out of 61 sham alerts would
qualify.
For Fig. 6, we ran a rank sum (Mann–Whitney) test
comparing the four quarters prior vs. four quarters post
results for actual alerts compared with sham alerts. The
median percent change was significantly lower for actual
alerts (-4.8 %) than for sham alerts (59.3 %) with
U = 2,603 (p = 0.000145).
4 Discussion
With regard to AE reporting, while we did find evidence
for clear cases of ‘‘stimulated reporting’’ in a subset of
drugs examined, the majority of FDA alerts did not appear
to undergo substantial changes in reporting rates because of
such warnings. When we compared AE reporting trends
before and after both FDA alerts and sham alerts, the
overall pattern of AE reporting was very similar between
the groups. This lack of an overall ‘‘stimulated’’ reporting
pattern held for the short-term (two quarters before and
after an alert was issued) and long-term (four quarters
before and after) analyses, as well as the all primary sus-
pect cases and AE-specific/drug pair analysis.
Numerous factors are likely to influence whether a given
FDA alert results in ‘‘stimulated’’ changes in drug use and/or
AE reporting, including: how serious the AE mentioned in
the alert is, whether the guidance requires increased work-
load for prescribers, the extent of FDA and media coverage,
whether the scientific basis of the warning is widely
accepted, the specificity of the warning, and whether the
alert includes guidance for the selection of safer alternatives.
Traditional media coverage also shapes the dissemina-
tion of emerging drug safety information and can signifi-
cantly affect the impact of FDA warnings (for a review, see
Yong et al. [73]). One study found that 100 % of news-
paper articles included at least one mention of a benefit of a
newly approved drug, while only 32 % mentioned at least
one harmful effect [74]. The Internet can also be a sig-
nificant factor in behavioral changes to drug safety infor-
mation [75]. Unfortunately, sometimes the message
delivered by regulatory authorities is not the same one that
is relayed by the media [73, 76–78].
Fig. 5 Short-term percent changes in specific adverse event/drug pair case reporting for real alerts compared with sham alerts. 2Q two quarters
Fig. 6 Long-term percent changes in specific adverse event/drug pair case reporting for real alerts compared with sham alerts. 4Q four quarters
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Willingness to follow the FDA’s guidance is yet another
variable that can have a significant impact. For example, in
one study of REMS guidance, 71 % of prescribing physi-
cians stated that it would be ‘‘somewhat’’ to a ‘‘very’’
significant barrier to have to endure a locally available,
one-time training session of less than 2 h to guide them on
the proper use of emerging opioids [28]. Along the same
lines, another study demonstrated that prescribers are less
likely to comply with guidance that entails increased
patient contact [49]. Additionally, a specific FDA guidance
suggesting ‘‘close supervision’’ of patients to monitor
something as serious as increased risk of suicide appeared
to be entirely disregarded [48].
As in most areas of risk communication, FDA warnings
and alerts appear to be most effective when they are
specific, offer alternative options, and are repeated.
Indeed, other studies [17, 79–82] have suggested that FDA
alerts must be concise, actively publicized through scien-
tific and traditional media, and offer immediate prescrib-
ing options (not added educational programs or increased
patient time) for warnings to trigger meaningful pre-
scribing changes.
We are encouraged that modern FAERS data do not
appear to suffer from the biases that would be introduced
by significant shifts in reporting owing to the issuance of
FDA alerts.
4.1 Limitations
The limitations of our study include the fact that we did not
have data to correlate how much media coverage accom-
panied each FDA warning, nor any way to gauge how well
each warning was communicated to, or received by, pre-
scribers. We were not able to determine if any of the FDA
alerts we analyzed were pre-dated by alerts issued in non-
US countries. We measured the ‘‘primary suspect’’ case
reports in an attempt to restrict the analysis to those drugs
directly suspected of causing the AE, but such a selection
process could have unintended consequences with regard to
the analysis of stimulated reporting as the impact on sec-
ondary suspects was not studied. Scrip (drug usage) num-
bers were not available to correlate with AE counts. The
inclusion criteria of 40 cases were intended to focus the
analysis on drugs that had sizeable use rates and was also
needed to make the dataset a manageable size. Such steps,
however, may have excluded certain drugs where AE
reporting trends went up or down after an alert. Using each
drug as its own internal control necessitated the use of
drugs that had at least nine quarters of FAERS data before
an actual FDA alert, potentially biasing the sham alert
analysis towards slightly older drugs. Our results are based
upon the FAERS database alone, so the relation between
our findings and smaller databases is unknown. The
strength of this research is that it comprehensively exam-
ined a large number of individual drugs, included all FDA
warning types, and analyzed trends over an extended per-
iod of time.
5 Conclusion
While there is no doubt that occasionally an FDA alert can
have a profound influence on AE reporting rates for a given
drug, we were struck by how similar the overall reporting
trend distributions were between drugs with real compared
with sham alerts. We therefore suggest that modern day AE
reporting trends do not appear to be substantially affected
by FDA alerts.
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